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A commentary on
Personality and intentional binding: an exploratory study using the narcissistic personality
inventory
by Hascalovitz AC and Obhi SS. Front. Hum. Neurosci. (2015) 9:13. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00013
Hascalovitz and Obhi (2015) examined whether narcissism was related to a disturbed sense of
agency. Using the construct of intentional binding, which is thought to be a core element of agency,
they sought to determine whether the speed with which a voluntary action was perceived to have a
consequent effect differed according to levels of narcissism. They hypothesized that higher levels of
narcissismwill predict hyper-agency or increased sense that one’s actions will have immediate effects
on the world. Hascalovitz and Obhi note that this is consistent with observations that patients with
narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) often report that they feel in control of their environment
and tend to err on the side of an omnipotence, which they believe should result in admiration
from others. Indeed, persons with NPD are often described as feeling entitled, and quick to take
impulsive action if they are not perceived as they think they should, leading frequently to ruptures
in relationships that previously appeared solid.
Of note, there are many long-standing hypotheses about the potential relationship between
narcissism and agency, which suggest a different view. Kohut (1971), for instance, observed that a
core feature of NPD is a hidden sense of fundamental powerlessness, which involves being relatively
unable to influence others within the flow of life. Others have suggested that a lack of agency in
NPD leads to a loss of touch with the person’s deepest wishes resulting in the experience of being
flat, devitalized, and empty (Modell, 1984; Dimaggio et al., 2002; Dimaggio andAttinà, 2012). This is
consistent with clinical reports that recovery fromNPD involves increased agency in domains other
than social rank, such as creativity and playfulness (Dimaggio et al., 2015).
How then can these results be reconciled with the larger literature? Even with the limitations
that Hascalovitz and Obhi (2015) acknowledge prevent the generalizability of their study, their
findings suggest that with narcissism comes a heightened sense of effectiveness and control over
willful action. One possibility suggested by clinical reports (Ronningstam, 2009; Links, 2015) is that
persons with NPD alternate from hyper-agency to passivity and flatness. We would like to explore
a different possibility, specifically one that distinguishes instrumental agency, or agency in dealing
with the non-personal world, from interpersonal agency or agency, which involves affecting how
others think and behave. In other words, perhaps these results help us to see that in narcissism
there is not merely an excess or deficit in agency but a paradox in which there are high levels of
instrumental agency complimented by low levels of interpersonal agency.
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Persons with narcissism may have an initially high appraisal
of their abilities to complete tasks effectively (Kohut, 1971), but
then they may doubt that others will share this view. Therefore,
despite a kind of heightened intentional binding, they should
expect others will not properly admire their effectiveness and
control, leading back to reduction in their sense of agency gener-
ated by over-reliance on the judgment of others and ending up in
passivity. Indeed, we can well imagine how then the narcissist feels
so painfully and deeply powerless. They alternate from perceiving
that they possess considerable abilities to affect the world in
instrumental ways, to the perception that others do not share that
view and then believe that the negative perceptions of other people
cannot be affected. Thus, in narcissism, we hypothesize that there
may come a continuous oscillation between high instrumental
agency and low interpersonal agency. This would be consistent
with how relationships can be frustrating for patients with NPD
and also how relationships can be so quickly and irreparably
ruptured. Alternative ideas cannot be ruled out. For one, given
the chance that two subtypes of narcissism likely exist (Zeigler-
Hill et al., 2008), it is possible that the vulnerable subtype is
more closely linked to reduced agency, for example when fac-
ing a romantic rejection which affects an already unstable self-
esteem (Zeigler-Hill et al., 2011), while the grandiose type could
experience hyper-agency.
The possibility of a continuous oscillation between high instru-
mental agency and low interpersonal agency may point to ques-
tions for future research. For one, it would seem possible to
measure both self-appraisal of personal effectiveness in instru-
mental laboratory tasks and also the extent to which participants
think others will agree with their appraisal of their abilities. It
would also seem important to use tasks that involve appraisals
of real-life social outcomes. In addition, there may be an even
more nuanced set of relationships at play. As observed in session,
persons with narcissism can experience rapid shifts in their states
of mind (Dimaggio et al., 2008) as determined by interpersonal
events. It has been suggested (Kohut, 1971; Ronningstam, 2009;
Dimaggio et al., 2014; Pincus et al., 2014) that swings between
an inflated sense of personal worth and a sense of virtual non-
existence and failure largely depend on the presence of support
and admiration from the environment. Thus, a lack of interper-
sonal agency may result in changes in self-appraisal of instru-
mental agency. This suggests that laboratory tasks seeking to
measure agency in narcissism requires appropriate priming. One
hypothesis is that after having been primed with experiences
of social or romantic rejection, narcissistic-related oscillations
in the sense of agency for instrumental tasks would appear.
After social rejection, for example some high in grandiose nar-
cissism may experiment increased sense of agency, while those
with vulnerable narcissism may resemble the profile of persons
with depression or low self-esteem and experience diminished
agency.
Finally, a range of other questions also exist including whether
what hyper-agency observed here is a function of just having a
personality disorder in general or specific to this one kind of
phenomenon. Work is thus needed, for example, with patients
with dependent or avoidant traits (Dimaggio et al., 2015). As
there may be different forms of narcissism, work is needed to
determine whether agency is affected in similar ways in different
manifestations of the condition or even more closely linked to
some aspects of narcissism than others.
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